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NO MAGIC FORMULA: A NEW APPROACH FOR
CALCULATING THE TEN YEAR TIME PERIOD FOR
ADMISSION OF PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE
Amy E. Sloan*

INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Evidence 609 governs the admission of prior conviction evidence. The requirements for admitting evidence of prior convictions
under the rule vary according to the amount of time that has elapsed from
the later of either the date of conviction or the date of release from
confinement for the conviction.· If less than ten years have passed, evidence of the conviction is more easily admitted than when more than ten
years have elapsed.2
Calculating the ten year period is fairly straightforward in most cases.
Calculation becomes confusing, however, when the witness has been
confined for violating the terms of probation, parole, or some other period
of conditional release. 3 Does the confmement for violation of conditional
release (V OCR) constitute confinement for the original crime? Should the
nature of the violation affect whether the VOCR confinement is deemed
confmement for the original conviction? Should the ten year clock start
over upon release from VOCR confinement? FRE 609 does not address
these questions. Thus, courts and commentators have developed their own
methods of calculating the time period to account for confmement for a
VOCR. 4 The proposed solutions, however, have resulted in conflicting and
unworkable results that are frequently at odds with the policies underlying
FRE 609.5
This article proposes that courts should treat the ten year time period
under FRE 609 as a statute of limitations which should be tolled for any
periods of confinement for VOCRs. Under this approach, courts would
measure the time period for prior conviction evidence without restarting

* Assistant Director, Lawyering Skills Program, The Catholic University of America Columbus
School of Law; University of Texas, B.A., 1985; The George Washington University National Law
Center, J.D., 1992. The author wishes to thank Morton J. Posner, Esq., for his invaluable assistance
with this article.
I
FED. R. EVID. 609 [hereinafter FRE 609].
2

Id.

) This article refers to violations of any type of conditional release as "VOCR."
• See Part II, infra.
id.
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the clock after a VOCR confinement. Thus, it avoids the harsh results that
may be caused by entirely erasing any period of law abiding conduct
before the VOCR confinement.6 Additionally, this approach treats all
VOCR confmements similarly. Thus, it enables courts to avoid the inconsistencies inherent in methods that vary the impact of the VOCR confinement according to the nature or severity of the conduct triggering the
confinement. 7 The statute of limitations approach will be easier for courts
to apply and is more consistent with the policies underlying the rule than
the other approaches that have been proposed and adopted. s
Part I of this article traces the history of FRE 609. 9 Part II evaluates
the different approaches for calculating the time period. 1O Part III proposes
the statute of limitations approach, illustrating how it leads to superior
results in the types of situations courts have faced in the past and are likely
to face in the future. 11 This article concludes that litigants, trial courts,
and appellate tribunals will be better served by the statute of limitations
model. 12
THE

I.

LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF

FRE 609

Under FRE 609, prior convictions are admissible only for impeachment and only in a limited number of situations. First, convictions involving crimes of dishonesty are automatically admitted if they are less than
ten years old, without regard to the balance between potential prejudice
and probative value.13 Second, FRE 609 generally favors admission of
felony l4 convictions that are less than ten years old.1S If the witness is
not a criminal defendant, the admission of a prior felony conviction is
subject only to the requirements of PRE 403, which requires a court to
admit the evidence unless the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. 16 If the witness is a criminal

See infra text accompanying notes 81-91 and 137-38.
See infra text accompanying notes 73-79.
8 See Part III, infra.
• See infra text accompanying notes 13-35.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 36-91.
" See infra text accompanying notes 92-139.
12 See infra text accompanying note 140.
IJ FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
14 Technically, the rule pennits admission of convictions for crimes punishable by death or by
more than one year of incarceration. This generally means that felony convictions will be admissible.
although any crime that meets these requirements. whether or not denominated as a "felony," would
be admissible under the rule. For the sake of simplicity. this article refers to crimes. other than crimes
of dishonesty, that are punishable by death or more than one year in prison as "felonies."
., FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(I).
16 rd.; FED. R. EVID. 403.
6

7
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defendant, a prior felony conviction "shall be admitted" if the court makes
the converse determination that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
impact. 17 By contrast, both dishonesty and felony convictions that are
more than ten years old are presumptively inadmissable. Under FRE
609(b), older convictions may be admitted only if their probative value
substantially outweighs their prejudicial impact. 18 Thus, the ten year mark
defines the line between convictions that are automatically or generally
admissible and those that are presumptively inadmissible. If ten years have
elapsed since the later of the date of conviction or the release of the witness from confinement imposed for the conviction, the evidence is presumptively inadmissible, regardless of whether the conviction at issue is
for a felony or a crime of dishonesty.
FRE 609 did not always measure the time period this way. In 1969,
the Advisory Committee proposed a draft of the rule, proposed Rule
6-09(b), that contained a significant difference from the current version of
FRE 609(b).19 Under the proposed draft, a conviction became presumptively inadmissible after ten years had elapsed "since the date of the release
of the witness from confmement, or the expiration of the period of his
parole, probation, or sentence, whichever is the later date.,,2o
In proposing this language, the Advisory Committee acknowledged
that few state evidence codes recognized a time limit for convictions but
noted that "practical considerations of fairness and relevancy demand that
some boundary be recognized.,,21 Congress first demonstrated a desire for
a recognized boundary in 1970, when it adopted a ten year time limit for
impeaching convictions in the District of Columbia courtS. 22 That evi-

17 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)( I). This formulation of the prejudice/probative value balancing test makes
admission of felony convictions to impeach criminal defendants more difficult than for other witnesses.
Nevertheless, it favors admissibility more than the test for older convictions under FRE 609(b). See
infra note 18 and accompanying text.
18 FRE 609(b), as it has appeared, unchanged, since 1975 provides:
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confmement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the
court determines, in the interest of justice, that the probative value of the conviction
supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
However, evidence of a conviction more than IO years old as calculated herein, is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice
of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest
the use of such evidence.
" Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161,296 (1969).
20 [d. (emphasis added).
21 [d. at 299.
22
District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, § 133(a), Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat.
473,550-51 (1970) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1989». An earlier version of
the District of Columbia evidence rule contained no time period at all for the use of old convictions.
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dence rule was the model both for proposed Rule 6-09(b) and the current
version of Rule 609. 23
In 1971, the Advisory Committee proposed a revised draft of the
federal rule which deleted the language measuring the ten year time period
from the date of expiration of "parole, probation, or sentence."24 Following the Advisory Committee's submission of the revised draft, the Justice
Department sought to change paragraph (b) of the rule to conform with the
District of COlumbia Code. 2s The Judicial Conference made the change,
which was then adopted by the Supreme Court. 26 As submitted to Congress, the rule read:
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of the release of the
witness from confinement imposed for his most recent conviction. or the
expiration of the period of his parole. probation. or sentence granted or
imposed with respect to his most recent conviction. whichever is the later
date. 21

Thus, the "parole, probation, or sentence" language was reinserted. 28 In
addition, language was added permitting admission of all prior convictions
if less than ten years had elapsed since the most recent conviction, not the
conviction sought to be used. 29
The changes were rejected, however, once the proposed rule reached
the House Judiciary Committee. The Committee decided to retain the
original language from the revised draft, which omitted the reference to
"parole, probation or sentence" and established a ten year time limit for
each individual conviction. 30 Congress concurred and adopted the rule as
it exists today, requiring courts to measure the time period for admission of
prior conviction evidence from the later of the date of conviction or the date

See Pan II of District of Columbia Code. Judiciary & Judicial Procedure. Pub. L. No. 88-241.77 Stat.
478.519 (1963).
23 See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates [Supreme Court Draft]. 56
F.R.D. 183.270 (the Supreme Court draft of FRE 609, which was based on proposed Rule 6-09. was
"drafted to accord with the Congressional policy manifested in the 1970 legislation" enacting the provision of the D.C. Code permitting admission of prior conviction evidence).
14 Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates. 51
F.R.D. 315. 391 (1971).
" See 28 CHARLES A. WRIGIIT & VICTOR J. GOLD. FEDERAL PRAcnCE & PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 6131 (1993) [hereinafter WRIGIIT & GOLD].
2. Id.
27 Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates [Supreme Court Draftl. 56 F.R.D.
183.269-70 (1972) (emphasis added).
28 Id. Compare notes 20 & 24. supra. and accompanying text.
29 See WRIGIIT & GOLD. supra note 25. § 6131.
3<> H.R. REp. No. 650, 93d Cong .• 1st Sess. (1973). reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051. 7085;
see WRIGIIT & GOLD. supra note 25. § 6131.
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of release from confmement for that conviction. 31
The Committee's rejection of the proposed language is instructive. It
demonstrates that Congress' main goal was to establish a fixed period
during which a particular criminal conviction is probative for impeachment. 32 At the end of that period, probative value evaporates. Congress
could have set that time period to run at the end of interva1s during which
a convict is "in custody" (i.e., on parole or probation), but not within prison
wa1ls. In addition, Congress could have required ten years of law abiding
conduct from the most recent conviction before erasing the probative va1ue
of prior conviction evidence. Congress rejected both of these options.
Instead, under the rule as adopted, the critica1 triggering event is release
from confinement, and even then, only confmement for the conviction that
a litigant seeks to admit into evidence.
Congress did not, however, completely eliminate the admissibility of
older conviction evidence. The Senate Judiciary Committee, and later the
entire Senate, approved an amendment to the House enactment conferring
discretion on trial judges to admit convictions older than ten years that they
deemed to be probative. Cryptica1ly, the Committee reported that "[i]t is
intended that convictions over I 0 years old will be admitted very rarely and
only in exceptional circumstances. ,>33 It is unclear whether the Committee
thought that trial judges would rarely encounter situations in which a
litigant would seek to admit evidence of an older conviction, or whether it
believed that tria1 courts would only occasionally have reason to admit such
evidence. The Conference Committee accepted the Senate's version of the
rule and added its own amendment requiring the proponent of an old
conviction to give notice to the other side.34 The Conference Committee
added the notice provision "to avoid surprise" at tria1. 35 This requirement
fortunately provided counsel and the tria1 court with time to determine the
amount of time that had actua1ly elapsed since release from confmement.
Although FRE 609(b) specifies that the ten year period begins at the
later of the date of conviction or release from confmement, the rule does
not specify whether a later confmement for a VOCR affects the ca1culation.
Thus, courts have developed two methods for computing the time period
when a witness has been confmed for a VOCR after the date of conviction

FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
See 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 284 (2d ed.
1994) [hereinafter MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK) ("Like most time limits set by law, the IO-year period
established by FRE 609(b) has no magical properties, and serves mostly the need for some reasonable
cutoff .... ").
33 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7062.
,. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7103.
3S [d.
31

32
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or release from the initial period of confmement imposed for the conviction.
Part II discusses these two approaches.
Two APPROACHES FOR MEASURING THE TEN YEAR TIME PERIOD IN

II.

VOCR SITUATIONS
Courts have developed two undesirable approaches for measuring the
ten year time period when the witness has been confmed for a VOCR. The
first approach, the "technical/substantive" approach, distinguishes between
"technical" and "substantive" violations to determine whether release from
confinement for a VOCR is the starting point for calculating the ten year
period. 36 Under the second approach, the "bright-line" approach, the ten
year time clock always starts over upon release from confmement for a
VOCR, without regard either for the nature of the violation or for any
period of law abiding conduct preceding the VOCR. 37 The results under
the technical/substantive approach are unworkable and potentially inconsistent, while the results under the bright-line rule are often unduly harsh.
Neither approach is in keeping with the policies underlying the rule.
United States v. Brewer, the first reported decision addressing the
VOCR confinement question, is the source of both the technical/substantive
and bright-line approaches. 38 In that case, Brewer moved to suppress the
government's use of his past convictions in a trial scheduled for March 15,
1978.39 On October 10, 1960, he had been convicted on a federal kidnapping charge and sentenced to ten years. 40 He was paroled on June 27,
1967,41 but while on federal parole, he was convicted of three felony rape
and assault charges in Ohio state court. 42 The Ohio convictions triggered
a violation of parole in the federal case, and after serving five-and-a-half
years for the state crimes, he was recommitted to federal custody on the
earlier kidnapping conviction. 43 He was paroled from federal prison a
second time on February 9, 1976.44 The Brewer court ruled that all of the
convictions were within the ten year time period of PRE 609(b). 45
Brewer's release from confmement for the state convictions was clearly
within ten years of the 1978 trial. 46 As to the 1960 federal conviction, the
See infra text accompanying notes 38·80.
See infra text accompanying notes 81·91.
l8 451 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
39 [d. at 51.
'" [d. at 52.
36
37

•, [d.
[d.
'3 [d .
.. [d.
4S [d. at 52.53.
46 [d. at 52. The Brewer court unartfuJly stated its reasoning concerning the state convictions. The
'2
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court ruled that reconfmement on the parole violation was confinement for
the original conviction, and that the 1976 release from reconfinement was
within ten years of the 1978 trial. 47 Thus, the first reported decision established the position that the ten year period begins at the last release from
confinement, even when the confinement is not for the original sentence,
but rather is imposed for a VOCR. 48
Building on Brewer, two Ninth Circuit panels developed the technical/substantive approach to applying FRE 609(b). In United States v.
McClintock,49 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling in limine permitting use of a prior conviction. McClintock was on
trial for mail fraud arising out of professional fundraising activities. 50 He
had previously been convicted of mail fraud in professional fundraising in
December of 1967.51 The court withheld sentence on the 1967 conviction,
and he received five years of probation.52 As one condition of his probation, McClintock was to refrain from engaging in fundraising activities.
McClintock failed to comply with this condition,53 and as a result, his
probation was revoked in January of 1972. He was sentenced to three years
in prison for violating the terms of his parole.54 Despite the three-year
sentence, McClintock was again paroled in February of 1973.55 His second
prosecution for mail fraud began on January 8, 1982.56 Because the 1973
release from confmement on the probation revocation was less than ten
years from the 1982 trial, the trial court admitted the conviction, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 57
In ruling that the conviction fell within the ten year time period, the
McClintock court determined that, under the circumstances of that case,
release from confmement on a probation revocation should be treated no

court failed to articulate clearly that the release from state confinement was in fact less than 10 years
prior to trial. Rather, it said that the earliest possible release under the state sentences (which ranged
from 1-5 to 3-20 years) was one year from the sentencing, which was within ten years. [d. The court
made no mention of whether Brewer was credited with the time between arrest and sentence on conviction which, calculating from the date of sentence, would have changed the result under the court's
reasoning.
47 [d. at 52 .
.. Ultimately, the Brewer court refused to admit the kidnapping conviction because it determined
that the three state convictions were more probative of truthfulness than the federal conviction was
prejudicial. [d. at 54. Rather than risk what it called "overkill" in impeachment, the court disallowed
use of the kidnapping conviction. Id.
•• United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985).
so Id. at 1281-82.
" Id. at 1287.
" Id.
S3 Id.
S4 Id.
5' Id. at 1287-88.
50

Id.

S7

Id. at 1288-89.
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differently than the release from confinement on a parole revocation in
Brewer. 58 The court's decision placed special emphasis on the conduct for
which McClintock's probation had been revoked: failure to refrain from
charitable fundraising. 59 The court believed that McClintock's failure to
abide by the condition was a substantive violation of probation directly
related to the underlying criminal conduct of fraudulent fundraising. 60
Rather than confine itself to the Brewer reasoning-that confinement for a
VOCR relates back to the original conviction-the McClintock court held
that confinement for a "substantive" probation violation implicating the
underlying conviction is confinement on the underlying crime.61 The court
would not, however, endorse a blanket rule that confmement for a VOCR
always represents confinement on the original conviction for PRE 609(b)
purposes.62 According to the McClintock court, district courts should have
discretion in calculating the ten year period based upon the nature of the
VOCR.63
The McClintock decision led a later Ninth Circuit panel to apply the
technicaVsubstantive approach in United States v. Wallace. 64 Wallace had
two prior convictions, a 1970 heroin trafficking conviction, and a 1977
perjury conviction.65 She had been paroled on the 1970 conviction,66 although the Ninth Circuit decision does not give the date of her release. The
1977 perjury conviction, however, triggered a violation of her parole on the
drug charge.67 As a result, she was reconfined from 1977 until 1980.68 In
1986, she went on trial again for heroin trafficking.69 Wallace unsuccessfully moved the trial court to prohibit the prosecution from using her 1970
conviction for impeachment purposes.70 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that the heroin conviction was inadmissible. Analogizing to McClintock, the
Wallace court stated that perjury was not "substantively related or parallel
to" the drug conviction.71 Accordingly, the reconfmement for the parole

58 Id. at 1288.
,. Id.
60 Id.
• , Id .
• 2 Id. at 1289.
• 3 Id.
.. 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988).
os Id. at 1472.
.. Id.
• 7 Id .
.. Id. at 1473 n.14.
69 The Ninth Circuit does not give Wallace's precise trial date, but it appears that her trial began
in 1986. She was indicted in January of 1986. Id. at 1467. In addition, the coun noted that, at the time
of the trial coun's evidentiary ruling, six years had passed since her 1980 release from reconfinement,
id. at 1472 n.14, which would place her trial sometime during 1986.
70 Id. at 1472.
71 Id.
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violation was not confinement on the substance of the 1970 heroin conviction, thus placing the 1970 conviction outside of the ten year time
limit. 72
The technical/substantive approach is unworkable in theory and
practice. In theory, the method is overinc1usive. Under McClintoce 3 and
Wallace,74 a VOCR is "substantive" if it parallels the underlying offense.
Thus, if a witness commits a second crime that tracks an earlier conviction
and is incarcerated both for the VOCR on the first crime and for the initial
conviction on the second crime, both convictions become admissible under
PRE 609. A witness who commits a second, unrelated crime, however, can
only be impeached with the more recent conviction, assuming the ten year
time period had expired on the earlier conviction. Thus, the technical/substantive distinction permits admission of an expanded, or
overinclusive, criminal history in the former situation. This, in fact, is the
very situation Congress rejected. As the history of the rule shows, Congress
rejected the version of PRE 609(b) which allowed admission of all the
witness' criminal history if less than ten years had elapsed from the release
from confmement on the most recent conviction. 7s Thus, the technical/substantive approach permits admission of evidence Congress sought to
exclude.
In practice, classification of VOCRs as "technical" or "substantive" is
unworkable because courts cannot classify offenses uniformly. The defmitions of "technical" and "substantive" that have been proposed by various
courts and commentators are sufficiently different to illustrate the difficulty
courts will have consistently distinguishing between the two. McClintock
and Wallace defme a "substantive" violation as one that "parallels or is
closely related to" the underlying offense. 76 Thus, by implication, anything
else, from failure to report to a parole officer to commission of a different
crime, would constitute only a "technical" VOCR. One court, which
ultimately rejected the reasoning in Wallace, offered the following
nonexhaustive list of "technical" violations: "consumption of alcohol,
leaving the county without a parole officer's permission, changing address
without notifying the parole office, failure to participate in psychiatric

72 [d. at 1472-73. The appellate court also said that the trial judge abused his discretion under
FRE 609(a) in admitting the prior heroin conviction. [d. at 1473. Because Wallace was being
prosecuted for heroin dealing, her prior heroin conviction was unduly prejudicial. particularly when the
perjury conviction was available to impeach her honesty. [d. Wallace conceded that the perjury
conviction was automatically admissible because it was a conviction for a crime of dishonesty that was
less than ten years old. [d. at 1472 n.ll; see FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
73 748 F.2d at 1288.
,. 848 F.2d at 1472.
" Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates [Supreme Court Draft], 56 F.R.D.
183.269-70 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
76 McClintock. 748 F.2d at 1288; Wallace, 848 F.2d at 1472.
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therapy, or failure to pay fines and costs. . . . ,,77 Under this defmition,
presumably commission of any other crime would be a "substantive" violation, although this is not certain because the court specifically declined to
state conclusively all types of conduct that would constitute "technical"
violations.78 One commentator offers the following definition of the terms
"substantive" and "technical" that combines aspects of the defmitions noted
above:
A substantive violation occurs where the witness engages in conduct related to
the crime for which he was convicted. A technical. violation occurs where the
witness engages in unrelated conduct, such as committing an entirely different
crime, leaving the jurisdiction, or failing to report to the probation or parole
officer.'9

Courts are likely to have difficulty determining what constitutes a
technical or substantive violation for purposes of FRE 609. Theoretically,
it is difficult to understand why commission of another crime is merely a
"technical" violation of the conditions of release. Intuitively, it seems that
a "technical" violation that is serious enough to warrant incarceration could
be as relevant to the veracity of the witness as some "substantive" violations. Moreover, courts are likely to reach inconsistent decisions concerning
the types of conduct that constitute "technical" and "substantive" violations.
Even if decisions within a given jurisdiction are consistent, various jurisdictions are likely to have different views concerning the types of conduct that
fall into each category. If different jurisdictions have divergent definitions
of technical and substantive violations, it is unclear which jurisdiction's
definition should control: the jurisdiction in which the VOCR occurred, or
the jurisdiction in which the current litigation is proceeding. Resolving these
questions may divert judicial resources from resolution of the underlying
case and create confusion among courts and litigants.
Moreover, even if the courts could agree on the defmitions of technical
and substantive violations, the practical difficulties inherent in determining
the precise nature of a particular violation make the distinction unworkable.
As the Washington Court of Appeals recognized when it rejected the technical/substantive approach, each time a court is called upon to decide whether
a VOCR is technical or substantive, "it would be necessary to get a
transcript of the hearing before either the parole board or the court to fmd

77 Commonwealth v. Jackson. 585 A.2d 1000. 1003 n.* (Pa. 1991); see also MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK. supra note 32, § 284 (advocating substantiVe/technical distinction as "commendably
simple and at least realistic" and derming "technical" violation as including conduct "such as failure
to report or brief absence from the jurisdiction for an unexcused but apparently innocent purpose.").
,. Jackson. 585 A.2d at 1003 n.*.
WRIGIIT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6136. Wright & Gold also reject the technical/substantive
distinction as an "unduly narrow reading" of FRE 609(b). Id.

7.
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out the exact basis of the revocation."80 A potentially impeaching conviction can come from anyone of the disparate state criminal justice systems
across the United States. A federal court in Idaho may be unable to discern
the treatment of a particular VOCR by the state courts of Maine. Thus, the
practical difficulties presented by the technical/substantive approach indicate
that it further confuses the question of admissibility of prior convictions,
rather than simplifying it.
The few state decisions addressing this issue have rejected the technical/substantive approach for precisely these reasons. 81 Of course, the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in state courts, but they have
influenced many state evidence codes and common law evidentiary rulings.
In those states with rules similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
courts' discussions are instructive. In an attempt to avoid the difficulties
inherent in the technical/substantive distinction, both the Washington Court
of Appeals82 and the Pennsylvania Supreme COU~3 have adopted a
"bright-line" approach. The Washington court chose the bright-line rule of
restarting the time clock after each release from VOCR confmement to
"expedite trials and reduce the chance for error.',84 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's view is that the probative life of a dishonest act is ten
uninterrupted years of freedom. 85 The ten year period recommences after
each confmement because incarceration eliminates the ability to demonstrate
rehabilitation in society.86 Both of these courts declined to apply the
McClintock/Wallace analysis to look behind the violation to determine if the
VOCR conduct paralleled the original crime.87
Certainly, time spent in incarceration does not demonstrate rehabilitation or entitle the witness to repose, but the bright-line approach is not the
only way resolve the problem. In fact, the bright-line rule can lead to
unnecessarily harsh results in some situations. For example, consider the
case of an individual convicted of perjury who completes a period of law
abiding conduct upon release from confinement, but who is incarcerated on
a VOCR for committing a misdemeanor not involving dishonesty or false
statements. Under the bright-line rule, the date of release from the confmement for the VOCR starts the ten year time period over. Perjury is a crime
of false statement under FRE 609(a)(2), which provides that the evidence

so State v. O'Dell, 854 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993),
(1994).
8' See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 82-87.
82 O'Dell, 854 P.2d 1096.
83 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 585 A.2d 1001 (pa. 1991).
.. O'Dell, 854 P.2d at 1099.
8' Jackson, 585 A.2d at 1003 .
.. Id.
87 Id. n .• ; O'Dell, 854 P.2d at 1099.

CUI.

denied., 114 S. Ct. 1316
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"shall be" admitted without regard to the balance between its probative
value and prejudicial impact.88 Thus, a court would have no discretion to
exclude the evidence if the individual were called to testify within ten years
of release from the VOCR confinement. This is the case even though the
misdemeanor conviction would not itself be admissible under FRE 609 and
has no bearing on veracity.
Technically, a witness could comply with the terms of release for a full
ten years before being confined for a VOCR. In that case, the bright-line
rule would require ten additional years of good conduct before granting
repose because the time period would start over upon release from the
VOCR confmement, effectively doubling the probative life of the conviction
from the ten year period defmed by Congress. This would be the case
regardless of whether the VOCR had any bearing on veracity.89
In either of these situations, the bright-line rule is at odds with the
policies underlying the rule as written. Because the bright-line rule starts the
full ten year period over whenever a witness is incarcerated for a VOCR, a
witness cannot be assured of repose until completing the entire term of
conditional release. As noted above, however, Congress expressly rejected
this approach when it removed the language measuring the time period from
the later of conviction "or the expiration of his parole, probation or sentence ... .'>90
Moreover, like the technical/substantive approach, the bright-line rule
is overinclusive because, in effect, it permits admission of the witness'
entire criminal history if a conviction for a subsequent crime also triggers
a VOCR on an older conviction. Rather than limiting impeachment to the
more recent conviction, the bright-line rule permits admission of the older
conviction by virtue of the fact that the time clock on the older conviction
starts over upon release from confinement for the VOCR. Again, this
accomplishes a result Congress explicitly sought to avoid when it rejected
the Justice Department's proposal that all convictions be admissible until

.. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). It should be noted that in Pennsylvania a witness may only be
impeached with prior convictions for crimes of dishonesty. See. e.g .• Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 650
A.2d 462 (Pa. Super. Ct 1994) .
• 9 This latter result may be inconsistent with one of the justifications offered by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in adopting the bright-line rule-that a conviction retains its probative value until
completion of 10 uninterrupted years of good behavior. Jackson, 585 A.2d at 1003. If IO consecutive
years of law abiding conduct entitles a witness to repose, then the conviction in such a situation should
not be admissible in the absence of special circumstances because the witness has completed the requirements for repose. Yet the result of the bright-line rule is to stan the clock over without regard for
the period of law abiding conduct. As a consequence, the bright-line rule is potentially inconsistent
with its proffered justification.
90 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.O. 161, 296 (1969); Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates
{Supreme Court Draft}, 56 F.R.O. 183,269-70 (1972).
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ten years have elapsed since the most recent conviction.91
Because FRE 609 provides no mechanism for measuring the ten year
time period when a witness is confined for a VOCR, courts and commentators have been forced to adopt their own methods of calculating the
time period under those circumstances. The technical/substantive approach
recognizes that some VOCRs should affect the witness' repose from
impeachment with prior conviction evidence, but that others are too minor
to merit erasing any prior period of law abiding conduct. In attempting to
take into account the individual circumstances of each situation, however,
the technical/substantive approach further muddies the water because
distinctions among the types of VOCRs become unworkable and inconsistent in practice. The bright-line rule, by contrast, sacrifices the equities of
individual situations for the ease of applying a blanket rule. This can lead
to unnecessarily harsh results. In addition, both of these approaches can be
overinclusive, permitting admission of evidence Congress sought to exclude
when it adopted the ten year time limit. In the next section, this article
proposes an alternative solution that offers both consistency through ease of
application and faithfulness to Congressional purpose-the statute of
limitations model.

III. THE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS MODEL

As a solution to the problems posed by the methods adopted by the
courts and commentators, courts should treat the ten year time period as a
statute of limitations beyond which prior conviction evidence cannot be admitted unless its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial
impact. When a witness violates any term of conditional release, whether
substantive or technical, and is incarcerated as a result, the "statute of
limitations" on prior conviction evidence should be tolled for the period of
incarceration, but the time clock should not start over again. Treating the
time period as a statute of limitations fmds support in both case law and
commentary on the rule. In addition, it avoids the pitfalls of both the
technical/substantive and bright-line approaches.
Under the statute of limitations approach, the time period calculations
would be fairly simple: the starting date for the calculation would be the
later of the date of conviction or release from any period of confmement
initially imposed for the conviction. If less than ten years have elapsed from
that date, the FRE 609(b) "statute of limitations" would not have run on the
conviction, and admission of the evidence would be governed by FRE
609(a). This would be the case regardless of any period(s) of confmement

91

See id; see also supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
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for VOCRs, and a court would have no occasion to consider the impact of
any VOCR confmement in measuring the time period. If, however, more
than ten years have elapsed since conviction or release from initial confmement, the court would need to consider whether the running of the "statute
of limitations" had been tolled by any period(s) of incarceration for
VOCRs. If more than ten years have passed from the date of the initial
conviction or release from confmement, less any period(s) of confmement
for VOCRs, FRE 609(a) would govern admission of the evidence. If the
date were still more than ten years ago, even after allowing for any tolling
period(s), then FRE 609(b) would govern admission of the evidence. This
formula would apply regardless of the nature of the violation. If the
violation also constituted a second crime, the formula would also have to be
applied to that crime to determine independently if the second crime is
admissible.
Date of conviction or release from initial confinement
Date of conviction or release from initial confinement

any period(s) of > 10 years
confinement for
VOCR
any period(s) of < 10 years
confinement for
VOCR

=

609(b)

=

609(a)

Case law supports the statute of limitations model. In United States v.
Mullins,92 the Fifth Circuit tolled the ten year time period while the defen-

dant was a fugitive. 93 The defendant had been convicted of armed robbery
and released from confmement in 1966. In 1974, he was indicted for
kidnapping and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.94
Rather than stand trial, he fled and remained a fugitive until December of
1976. At his trial, which began in February of 1977, evidence of the prior
armed robbery conviction was introduced to impeach the defendant's testimony.9s The defendant was convicted. On appeal, he argued that the
district court erred in admitting his prior conviction because the ten year
time limit on the conviction expired in 1976.96 The court summarily
rejected the defendant's argument, holding that the defendant's flight from
justice tolled the ten year time period under FRE 609.91 In reaching this
decision, the Fifth Circuit drew an analogy between the FRE 609 time
period and 18 U.S.C. § 3290, which provides that "[n]o statute of limita-

92

•,
..
•,
..
97

Id.
United States v. Mullins, 562 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978).
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tions shall extend to any person fleeing from justice. ,,98 The court held that
this statute reflected "a Congressional determination that defendants should
not gain advantages of statutory limitations by means of flight. ,09'} Thus,
the Mullins court expressly viewed the FRE 609 time period as a "statute of
limitations" for admission of prior conviction evidence.
One Fourth Circuit decision also provides support for the statute of
limitations approach. lOo In United States v. Gray, the defendant appealed
his conviction for extortion and tax fraud, arguing, inter alia, that his prior
bank robbery conviction should not have been admitted to impeach him. 101
Gray had been convicted of bank robbery approximately seventeen years
earlier and had been paroled on the conviction twelve years before his extortion and tax fraud trial!02 Nevertheless, Gray's parole for the bank robbery conviction was revoked for unspecified parole violations three years
after he was released, and he remained incarcerated on the charge at the
time of his extortion and tax fraud trial. I03 Thus, although the conviction
was more than ten years old, Gray had not completed ten years of law
abiding conduct under any method of calculating the time period. The
Fourth Circuit ruled that the evidence was properly admitted, reasoning that
ten year time limit in FRE 609(b) simply did not apply under those circumstances, and noting alternatively that the probative value of the conviction
outweighed its prejudicial effect!04 Although the Fourth Circuit referred
to United States v. McClintock, in reality, the Gray court relied on
McClintock only for its basic holding that recommitment for a parole violation represents incarceration on the original offense. lOS In fact, the result
in Gray was to toll the ten year time period while Gray was incarcerated for
the parole violation. I06
Commentators also support the statute of limitations approach. 107
When a witness commits a "technical" VOCR, Mueller & Kirkpatrick
would measure the time period as follows: "the beginning point of the
measuring period should not be moved forward to a point any later than the
date when the witness would have been released if he had been confined
immediately and served his full sentence."108 They go on to state that extending the probative value of a conviction based on a technical violation

98
99

[d.
[d.

•00 United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) .
•0. [d. at 139.
•02

[d.

•03

[d .

•0>

[d.
[d.

•04

note 25, § 6136 n.11 (treating Gray as a tolling case) .
note 32, § 284.

'06

WRIGIIT & GoLD, supra

•07

MUEu..ER & KIRKPATRICK, supra

•08

[d.
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"unrelated to the character traits indicated by the crime seems contrary to
the purpose of the measuring period which is to provide a rule of thumb to
weed out convictions whose age has drained away probative worth on
veracity."I09 The effect of this approach would be the same as that under
the statute of limitations model: the "impeaching life,,11O of the conviction
would be extended by the length of time the witness spent in confmement
for the VOCR. Whether this period is deducted from the amount of time
that has elapsed since conviction or release from confmement, or whether
the beginning point of the measuring period is moved forward, does not
affect the ultimate result. The problem, of course, with this proposal is that
it continues to rely on the technical/substantive distinction, which, as
discussed above, is a problematic model. II1
Applying a statute of limitations approach to all VOCRs, however,
achieves more desirable results than either the technical/substantive or
bright-line approaches. The statute of limitations model avoids the
definitional problems and practical difficulties inherent in the technical/substantive approach by treating all VOCRs identically. Thus, it has the
advantage of ease of application. Despite its uniform application, the statute
of limitations model avoids the harsh results that occasionally occur under
the bright-line rule. Moreover, the statute of limitations model avoids the
overinclusiveness that can occur under either of the alternatives. In effect,
it shifts the focus of the discretionary inquiry away from the measurement
of the time period, placing it where it more appropriately belongs-in
balancing the prejudicial impact and probative value of the evidence as
required by FRE 609(b). These advantages can be demonstrated by applying
the statute of limitations rule to cases and hypothetical situations under PRE
609. 112

For example, in McClintock, the witness was convicted of mail fraud
in December of 1967, but his probation was revoked in January of
1972.113 He was paroled on the VOCR confinement in February of 1973,

'09 Id. In fact, they suggest, confmement for technical VOCRs should be completely ignored for
purposes of FRE 609. Id. It seems unlikely, however, that a wimess will be incarcerated for a VOCR
that truly is too inconsequential to be noticed at all. Moreover, if one assumes that less serious
violations are likely to lead to shorter periods of VOCR incarceration, and that more serious ones to
longer periods, the "impeaching life" of the conviction under the statute of limitations model will only
be extended for a period of time that reflects the seriousness of the violation. In other words, minor
violations that nonetheless warrant incarceration are likely to result in less extension of the IO year
time period than serious violations warranting longer periods of incarceration.
Id.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 73-80; see also WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6136
n.15 (rejecting this proposal because the technical/substantive distinction is unworkable).
"' State v. O'Dell, 854 P.2d 1096 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1316 (1994),
does not provide the date of release on the VOCR. Thus, it is impossible to calculate the IO year
period using the statute of limitations approach for that case.
"' 748 F.2d 1278, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985).
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and he was called as a witness in January of 1982.114 Applying the statute
of limitations test, ten years from the release from original confmement
would have ended in December of 1977, but expiration of the time period
would be tolled for thirteen months, until January of 1979. Thus, the
conviction would not be presumptively admissible under FRE 609(a)(2),
and evidence of it would only come in if FRE 609(b) were satisfied. As a
result, the court could not have admitted the evidence unless it found that
the probative value of the mail fraud conviction substantially outweighed
the prejudicial impact." s
This result is more consistent with the policy behind the rule than
McClintock's strained interpretation of the confinement for a probation
violation as relating back to the original crime only because the "violation
involved a substantive probation condition and closely parallel[ed] the
initial [criminal] activity.,,116 The court went to great pains to stress that
its "narrow" holding was limited to the facts of that case, and that it did not
intend to state a converse rule that technical violations do not relate back to
the original conviction.1I7 A more principled way to limit the case to its
facts is to say that admission of the conviction is governed by PRE 609 (b)
because, although it was more than ten years old, the unusual circumstances
of the case dictated that it be admitted. I IS
The statute of limitations approach also leads to more principled results
when applied to Wallace." 9 In that case, the witness was convicted on a
drug charge in 1970 and on a perjury charge in 1977 .120 Because of the
perjury conviction, her parole on the drug charge was revoked, and she was
imprisoned for both perjury and VOCR.12I The witness was released from
reconfmement in 1980 and was on trial again in 1986. 122 The Wallace
court held that the 1977 incarceration did not relate back to the 1970
conviction because the perjury conviction was unrelated to the drug

114

[d. at 1287-88.

See FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
748 F.2d at 1288.
117 [d. at 1288-89.
118 One subtext that may underlie McClintock is the appellate court's reluctance to order a new
trial based on an erroneous evidentiary ruling. Because the trial court ruled that the conviction was less
than IO years old, and therefore automatically admissible under FRE 609(a)(2) as a crime of
dishonesty, it failed to make the requisite fmdings necessary to uphold admission under FRE 609(b).
[d. at 1288. Thus, the appellate court had the choice of changing the calculation of the time period to
justify affmning the trial court, or holding that the evidence was subject to FRE 609(b) balancing and
possibly having to reverse the conviction. This provides yet another justification in favor of a uniform
rule for calculating the time period. If trial courts have a uniform standard for calculating the age of a
conviction, they can make the requisite fmdings to support admission or exclusion of the evidence and
avoid situations in which appellate courts make strained rulings to avoid having to order new trials.
119 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988).
120 [d. at 1472.
121
Id.
122 [d. at 1473 n.14; see supra note 69.
liS
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conviction, thus taking the 1970 conviction outside the ten year period. 123
Under the statute of limitations approach, a court would achieve the
same result without having to make the technical/substantive distinction.
The witness completed approximately thirteen years of law abiding conduct
between 1970 and 1986, after allowing for three years of tolling during the
period of incarceration from 1977 until 1980. Thus, the drug conviction
would be more than ten years old and would be inadmissible except under
PRE 609(b), which is exactly the result the Wallace court reached. The
perjury conviction, by contrast, is a separate conviction, and the ten year
statute of limitations would not begin to run on it until the witness was
released from confinement in 1980. As a result, the perjury conviction
would have been automatically admissible under FRE 609(a)(2). This result
is more consistent with the result Congress sought to achieve in rejecting
the proposal that all convictions come in unless ten years have passed since
the most recent conviction. It prevents admission of the entire criminal history, limiting impeachment to the one conviction falling within the ten year
period, given that no exceptional circumstances justified admission of the
older conviction.
One commentator, while rejecting the technical/substantive distinction,
criticized the inconsistent results that can occur when courts undertake the
balancing inquiry under PRE 609(b).124 According to Wright & Gold, the
intent of FRE 609(b) was to prevent admission of convictions more than ten
years old except in very rare cases. 125 Thus, Wright & Gold assert, whenever a court questions whether to introduce an old conviction, it should not
admit the evidence. 126
Wright & Gold's rule, however, does not constitute a valid exercise of
discretion, but rather, is a failure to exercise discretion altogether. In fact,
the legislative history of PRE 609(b) does not clearly support Wright &
Gold's conclusion concerning the circumstances in which older convictions
should be admitted. 127 Moreover, an approach that permits discretion both
in calculating the time period and in weighing the probative value and
prejudicial impact of the evidence merely increases the confusion surrounding application of the rule by providing two opportunities for unjustified
and inconsistent results. 128 Therefore, uniform application of the statute of

123 [d. at 1472.73.
". WRIGIIT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6136.
125
126

Id.
Id.

127 See supra text accompanying note 33 (Committee's meaning in saying that older convictions
"will be admitted very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances" is unclear).
128 See, e.g., United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (permitting the
district court to consider the reasons underlying a VOCR not only in the probative value/prejudice
inquiry, but also in the calculation of the time period under FRE 609), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822
(1985).
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limitations approach in calculating the time period should create more
consistent results, even when it places a conviction outside the ten year
period.
As compared with the bright-line rule, the statute of limitations model
produces more principled results. For example, in Commonwealth v.
Jackson,J29 the Pennsylvania case adopting the bright-line rule, the witness
had been convicted of robbery in 1973, was paroled on June 30, 1976, was
reconfined for fifteen months for violating parole, and was released from
the second confinement in 1984.130 The witness was on trial again in
1988.131 Thus, under the bright-line approach, only four years had passed
since the release from reconfinement, rendering the release date well within
ten years.132 Using the statute of limitations approach, ten years from the
parole date would be June 30, 1986, but expiration of the statute would be
tolled for fifteen months for the VOCR, until approximately September 30,
1987. The evidence would not have been admissible in the 1988 trial,
therefore, unless the specific facts warranted admission under
Pennsylvania's equivalent of FRE 609(b).133
At this point, the Pennsylvania court could have applied the same
considerations to balance the probative value and prejudicial impact of the
evidence that convinced it to adopt the bright-line approach with respect to
the time period. Thus, the court could have considered the fact that the
VOCR on the robbery conviction was for theft,134 which might be a factor
militating toward admission of the older conviction. Moreover, as the court
noted, the original robbery conviction would have been admissible for
impeachment if the witness had served his entire ten year sentence. \3S
Thus, the court could have admitted the evidence to prevent the witness
from enjoying "a legally sheltered position due to the fact that he took
advantage of society's leniency by accepting a parole in 1976 when he used
the freedom obtained on parole to commit another crime."I36 These considerations are more appropriately raised in the probative value/prejudice
inquiry, rather than in the calculation of the time period.
The statute of limitations approach also avoids the potentially harsh
results of the bright-line rule. The probative value of the conviction would
be extended for the amount of time the witness was incarcerated for the

'29
130

585 A.2d 1001 (pa. 1991).
Id. at 1001.

"' Id.
IJ2 Id.
113 See id. at 1002 (If more than IO years have elapsed. the court cannot admit the evidence unless

"the value of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.") (citing Commonwealth v.
Randall. 528 A.2d 1326. 1329 (pa. 1987».
'34 585 A.2d at 1001.
133

'36

Jd. at 1003.
Id.
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VOCR, but the ten year time period would not start over. This would keep
the witness from losing the benefit of the period of law abiding conduct but
still take into account the fact that the witness cannot demonstrate rehabilitation during any period of confinement for the VOCR.
When the conviction is for a crime of dishonesty, the statute of
limitations rule also allows courts to retain greater discretion to consider the
potential prejudice and probative value associated with the evidence. Under
FRE 609(a), courts lack the discretion to exclude evidence of crimes of
dishonesty that are less than ten years old because such convictions are
automatically admissible. Thus, as noted earlier,137 the bright-line rule
could remove a court's discretion to exclude an older conviction for a crime
of dishonesty if the witness were incarcerated on an unrelated VOCR within
ten years of the trial date. By extending the probative life of the conviction
only for the period of VOCR confinement, rather than for another full, ten
year period, the statute of limitations approach allows the trial court greater
discretion to weigh admission of the evidence. Of course, even when the
statute of limitations model places a conviction outside the ten year period,
the court would still have discretion to admit the evidence if it determined
that the specific facts of the situation warranted admission.138 Thus, the
statute of limitations approach permits admission of the evidence when
appropriate, but allows trial courts to retain more discretion in determining
when older convictions for crimes of dishonesty should be admitted.
Under the statute of limitations approach, two difficult questions arise:
how to calculate the time period when the witness has completed ten or
more years of law abiding conduct before being incarcerated for a VOCR;
and how to measure the time period when the witness is still incarcerated
for a VOCR at the time of trial. When the witness has completed ten or
more years of law abiding conduct before being incarcerated for a VOCR,
the statute of limitations approach deems the conviction more than ten years
old because the statute would have run out before the VOCR confinement.
Thus, the conviction would remain presumptively inadmissible unless the
probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial impact.
It could be argued that a witness who waits until the passage of more
than ten years before violating the terms of conditional release is no more
entitled to repose than one who has engaged in such conduct before the
passage of ten years. To the extent this result presents concerns, however,
it is better addressed in the prejudice/probative value inquiry than in the
measurement of the time period. By automatically treating a conviction in
that situation as one that is more than ten years old, the statute of limitations rule operates as the reverse of the bright-line rule because the bright-

131

See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.

138

FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
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line rule would automatically treat such a conviction as less than ten years
old. As a result, the statute of limitations approach is no more arbitrary than
the bright-line rule. Yet where the bright-line rule can operate to eliminate
a court's discretion to exclude older convictions for crimes of dishonesty by
restarting the clock upon release from VOCR confinement, the statute of
limitations approach allows a court to retain discretion to admit the evidence under FRE 609(b) even when the VOCR confmement comes after the
expiration of the statute. Moreover, if the confmement for a VOCR is
occasioned by conviction for a second crime that otherwise is admissible
under FRE 609, the second crime may fall within the ten year period and
be admissible for impeachment even when the older crime is not.
When the witness is still incarcerated on the VOCR at the time of the
trial, two results may OCCUr.139 In a case in which more than ten years had
passed before the VOCR confinement, the statute of limitations approach
would, as noted above, automatically place the conviction in the FRE
609(b) category, with the fact of current incarceration certainly being one
special circumstance the court should consider in determining whether the
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial
impact. In a case in which less than ten years had passed before the VOCR
confmement, the conviction would remain less than ten years old during the
confinement because the confinement tolls the statute. Thus, in the latter
situation, the confinement would automatically fall within the ten year
period and be admissible according to FRE 609(a).
Overall, the statute of limitations approach leads to superior results
over both the techniCal/substantive and bright-line rules. It is more faithful
to the policy considerations of granting repose from impeachment with prior
conviction evidence to individuals who conform their conduct to the law for
ten years. It also provides courts with a uniform method of applying the
rule while maintaining their discretion to exclude or admit evidence based
on its prejudicial impact or probative value, rather than attempting to
achieve the same result through inconsistent methods of calculating the time
period.
CONCLUSION

In adopting FRE 609(b), Congress did not establish a method for
calculating the time limit for admission of prior conviction evidence. Trial
courts, faced with motions in limine often filed only days before trial, must
decide in short order whether to admit evidence without guidance from the

139 See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 100-106 (discussing Gray).
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rule or the Advisory Committee Notes. The appellate courts have not effectively addressed this question with the use of the technical/substantive and
bright-line approaches.
The statute of limitations model achieves superior results for litigants,
trial courts, and appellate tribunals. It considers the fact of confinement for
VOCR, but does so in a way that both preserves the trial court's discretion
and provides the trial court with a simple, easily applied test that avoids
inconsistent results. In this way, prior conviction evidence can be used in an
equitable, consistent manner without permitting those who have violated the
law to avoid impeachment on the stand when appropriate. The ten year
period "has no magical properties,"I40 and no magical formula is required
to calculate the time. A workable formula, however, is a necessity. The
statute of limitations model provides just such a formula.
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